When Omaha first arrived on the scene, I was taught by some “sound” players that you should fold after the flop unless you had trips, two high pair, or at least four cards to a high flush or straight. Even though all Omaha players have OFTEN tasted disaster on the infamous last card, many still do not realize the significance of the fact that over one third of your Omaha wins should be coming from last card draws. In order for you to be a consistent winner at Omaha, you must take aggressive efforts to win your share of last-card back-ins. The one black letter rule is that you have to try to keep percentages on your side.

It is necessary to recognize the potential of certain good “combination hands” after the flop, which frequently lead to winning last card draws, and hence are often sound mathematical investments. A “combination hand” is a four-card hand WITHOUT one of the usual desirable two-card combinations (as stated above), but does have SEVERAL lesser holdings (inside straights, pairs, two card flush or straight draws).

Of course, calling the bet after the flop (which under most playing conditions is only HALF the dollar amount of the two final bets) with a marginal hand (sometimes referred to as “fishing in“), is a very delicate proposition indeed. The three major factors are the likelihood of raises, the amount of money (dependent mostly on raises before the flop) already in the pot, and the number of other (or potential other) callers.

Because of the possibility of raises, it is clearly best to be in one of the later positions. Note that if there were no raises before the flop, there would be less money to “protect”, and even one raise would make calling quite anti-percentage. Not only do you have to put in more, but usually there will be fewer other callers to give you decent odds on your money. Thus, if you are in second seat after the flop and the first seat player bets, you will usually fold most marginal hands (unless the pot is large) because in this position raises are maximally likely. But in last calling position, especially if the pot is large, it is often mathematically correct to venture a call even on very speculative holdings.

Last night, a situation came up which you might find educational. I held ace and nine of spades, and an eight and six. The flop produced the seven of spades (a great card for me), jack of diamonds, and three of hearts. Since the pot had been raised once before the flop and since I was in last calling position with three other players, I believe I had a close call. Note that if a ten came on fourth street to fill my inside straight, there would only be 15 last card “bricks” (cards which cannot make full-houses, flushes or higher straights), which would retain my lock (ie. sixes, fives, fours and deuces), and a red ten would lower the brick number to 12. But, regardless of how fleeting, in limit Omaha, you would be delighted to bet or raise with any ten on fourth street.

The five of spades turned on fourth street! So now the following cards would improve me: Nine spades (but the jack or three might give someone a full house). Three tens (not double counting the spade ten). Three nines (I would lose to ten-eight). Two eights, two sixes, and three fours. Thus, there were 22 improvement cards, and 17 of these 22 outstanding cards (”outs”) would give me a lock win. Note that had the five been a non-spade, I would still have had 17 straight “outs”.

There was a bet, a call and a raise (probably a six-four) in front of me. I called and there was a reraise, a fold and then the last capping raise (another six-four). Obviously I had to call, and I wondered if the raisers were at all aware of how many “bad” last cards they had (it is actually easier to count their 12 good cards, “bricks”, namely non-spade aces, kings, queens and deuces).

The last card was the nine of clubs - not best, but better than nothing. I watched them both thinking about the possibilities. The first man checked, the second bet. Although I was willing to pay off to the ten-eight possibility (since I knew that two of their cards were six-fours), I just called to see if they wanted to continue the ride. The third man, however, just called. Unfortunately the first man also had an eight in reserve, so we ended up splitting the pot. This hand is a good example one of the more delicate Omaha fish-in situations.