In a recent discussion I was asked what I consider the most valuable single action or “tool” in playing Omaha. Another participant in the discussion expressed the opinion that the inhibitory raise was probably most valuable because it occurs quite frequently. An “inhibitory raise” is when you raise a person who bets in front of you, hoping to obtain a check around to you on the next round of betting (especially useful just after the flop because the betting limit doubles on the next round.

But although the inhibitory raise frequently saves you some dollars (and perhaps gains you some image points), it is certainly not the most valuable weapon in your arsenal.

That honor must logically belong to some action or “tool” or weapon that can potentially swing a whole (perhaps large) pot in your direction. Thus the most valuable single action is probably some kind of bluff that works frequently.

My vote for one of the most valuable ploys in Omaha and in many other forms of poker is what I refer to as the “hump bet” (which designation I first heard used in Reno many years ago and perhaps may have referred to the likelihood that someone often gets “humped” by such a bet, or, perhaps there is some metaphysical analogy as to how trains are brutally coupled).

A “hump” bet is simply where you make a final round bet with a mediocre hand when there are three or four players left in the pot and you suspect that the player on your right has you beat with a slightly better mediocre hand. You bet, which of course could work out as a bluff, but sometimes you get called by a middle player who does not have you beat, and the player on your right then folds (the mediocre winning hand), incorrectly assuming that one of you has a reasonable hand.

In Omaha, especially when the last card creates straight or backdoor flush prospects, a leading bettor (with two high pair or trips) on your right can often be “humped” out by a bet and a call. A classic example occurred when a player on my right, who usually raises only with aces, raised before the flop, and I called with QQT6 double suited.

The flop was a paltry 982 unsuited and the raiser bet. Since I suspected he was pushing his aces I raised hoping to drop competition and have control after fourth street. It didn’t work. Two other players called the raise cold and the aces called. A dangerous five hit the table on fourth street so I checked planning to give it up - but everyone else checked also!

The last card was a deuce pairing the board. The aces checked to me, so I bet. One of the other players called my bluff with his nines and sevens (”top two”), and the aces quickly folded, thus making me the winner.

Of course, one of the problems with all this is that sometimes you manage to hump the winning hand out, but the middle caller beats you (if in above example caller had pocket kings). Not only do you lose the pot and the extra bet, but you also make a mortal enemy!