Although limit Omaha is generally not a bluffer’s game, there are certain situations where a bluff has a relatively high likelihood of success. The real trick of course is to recognize the signs which indicate a favorable time to try to pull it off. It helps to develop a good feel for “high life” situations in poker, when one or more players apparently get inspired and start raising on their looks (we know, you are asking yourself, “Are there any poker players who are that good looking?”). Some “great gamblers” just seem to know intuitively when to try the big bluff. But, unless you actually have the ability to flat-out read most of the other players, or have some kind of subliminal perception or ESP, a higher percentage of bluffing success can be achieved by us mere mortals who understand the theory of what rates to be happening at the poker table.

One of the more scientific aspects of four card high Omaha (there are many) is the high correlation between what the expert expects to be happening and what is really happening at the table. Note, for example, that it is much harder to accurately judge holdings in high-low Omaha. In a nine to eleven handed Omaha game with six or more players seeing the flop, you can often “advance chart” with reasonable accuracy approximately how many players should have certain types of holdings. For example, suppose we are playing in a ten player game, seven players see the flop, and the flop comes up with king and six of spades, and eight of diamonds. This sort of flop often gets around five callers, two with flush comes, two with multi-draw straight comes (that is, eight or more “outs”; inside straights should fold, noting the flush threat, three “outs” instead of four), and perhaps two holdings with either two (high?) pair or hidden set (trips). One or two players (hopefully you) may have more than one of the above holdings in their four cards.

Of course, in a loose game you may well get additional fish callers with none of the above. But the whole point is that normally you know what the other players rate to have, even though you do not know exactly which players have which holdings.

The fourth street “turn” is very consequential. If the board pairs on fourth street, there will be a mass exodus of flushers and straighters. If the fourth street card is a (third) spade, the straighters will respectfully fold. But if a straight-making card “turns” (from a four to a ten), we might well get some real action on fourth street. This is one of those typical “high life” situations when it is not always clear who is betting what cards. If no one actually has the “nut” straight, the pot is officially up for grabs. NOTE WELL THAT THIS MIGHT BE OPPORTUNITY TIME! Whatever you happen to be coming with, raising is probably a good investment, since it not only gets more money into the pot if your come happens to hit (say about twenty percent of the time), but it also puts tremendous pressure on the low-end straight(s), and thereby seizes the initiative,

which as we know, often wins pots. One or two raises will usually drop the non-”nut” straights, thereby setting the stage for your last card shenanigans. If the last card is a brick (that is, no pair, no spade, no extended straights), whoever gets his money in first often wins the pot, IF there is no REAL “nut” straight present.

The bottom line is we are weighing the dollars lost that percent of the time when the nut straight is present, plus when you get caught bluffing (which of course does have some future equity), versus the value dollars gained when your come hits or when the big bluff works. Since this particular type of bluff seems to work quite frequently, this whole speculative endeavor seems to be a good winning proposition.

I can remember successfully stealing a number of pots in situations similar to the above. Yesterday in a five-ten-fifteen (fifteen at the end) game the above flop occurred. I was in with the ace and another spade. There had been one raise before the flop (raised by the blind), and the same blind had bet the flop getting five quiet callers (no raises). The fourth card was the seven of hearts. The blind bet and the second player, who frequently raises on air, raised. I was sitting in third seat with my “nut” four flush, knowing that I was sucked in anyway. So I, a relatively tight player, raised! One player to my left called the triple bet, the blind painfully folded (!), and the raiser reluctantly called. A true brick (no pairs, no flushes, no further straights) graced the table on fifth street, and the raiser dutifully checked to me. Of course I went for it and bet the fifteen. Both remaining players folded with little thought, and the dealer pushed this good size pot in my direction.

The moral of the story is that even though you seldom steal a big pot in Omaha, occasionally opportunity presents itself. These hands most frequently occur when there are a number of comers who do not come. But in order to get the real winner(s) out, you have to convince them that YOU are the comer WHO HAS HIT! A more dangerous variation of this theme occurs when the board pairs on fourth street and you raise with merely an overpair (which is low odds to fill on fifth street), but the big bluff might well win the pot absent other full boats. Note that bluffing the fourth street flush card (that is, the third card of any suit) seldom works, since one of the real flushes will usually call.

Just for the record, in the above hand the player who called the triple raise said he had trips, and the raiser had king other of spades. The blind had raised before the flop on two aces (suited) and a four-five, and (correctly) folded his low straight when faced with the double raise (which might have been capped). Of course I was lucky that things worked out so well, but the point should be clear. When there are big pots up for grabs, it might as well be you that does the grabbing.